communities of identity. The growth of the Internet population generated a substantial literature theorizing about the potential consequences of virtual communities for exacerbating or overcoming the 'tragedy of the commons' (Rheingold 1993; Schuler 1996; Tsagarousianou, Tambini and Bryan 1998; Jones 1998; Bimber 1998) . Empirical research has examined many dimensions of online communities including in-depth ethnographic studies of particular groups like The Well; content analysis of participants in Internet list-servs and chat rooms; and studies of the most effective features of community organization websites (see Holmes 1997; Jones 1998; Hill and Hughes 1998; Davis 1999 Commitments to any particular online group can often be shallow and transient when another is but a mouse-click away. Most purely online communities without any physical basis are usually low-cost 'easy-entry, easy-exit' groups. To avoid cognitive dissonance it is simpler to 'exit' rather than working through any messy bargaining and conflictual disagreements within the group. Like adherents to particular leftwing or rightwing talk radio shows, or readers of highly partisan newspapers, the result of participating in online communities could be expected to reinforce likeminded beliefs, similar interests, and therefore ideological homogeneity among members. So many interest groups, organizations and associations are available on the Internet that it is exceptionally easy to find the niche website or specific discussion group that reflects one's particular beliefs and interests, avoiding exposure to alternative points of view. Thousands of networks are devoted to bringing together like-minded souls ranging from anarchists, hippies and vegetarians to skinheads, and survivalists. A cornucopia of discussion groups span everything from the issues of abortion and afrocentrism to welfare reform and xenotransplantation. You can monitor human rights with Amnesty International, the environment with Greenpeace, or the state of democracy with the National Democracy Institute. Or, should you be so inclined, you can visit hundreds of policy think tanks in D.C. ranging from the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute to the Brookings Institution and the Twentieth Century Fund. Hyper-pluralism and overspecialization among marginalized groups can be expected to encourage bonding among regular members.
Yet this is far from the whole story because, on the other hand, certain features of the Internet could be expected to bridge traditional social divides. Textual communication via the Internet strips away the standard visual and aural cues of social identity -including those of gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status -plausibly promoting heterogeneity, where 'no one knows that you are a dog on the Internet' (Holmes 1997) . Social psychologists suggest that this anonymity could be most important for marginalized populations who are otherwise isolated from cultural interactions outside of their group, such as single mothers working at home, gay men, or rural poor populations (McKenna and Bargh 1998) . The digital divide in the early years of adoption hinders social diversity but the normalization of the Internet population in America, as access spreads more widely, should also promote greater inclusiveness for poorer and less educated sectors, as well as for women and ethnic minorities. The lack of barriers to entry means that once social groups are online, most virtual communities are fairly permeable to new members.
These considerations lead us to the typology of the societal function of online communities outlined schematically in Figure 1 . The classification assumes that pure bonding groups are most likely to occur online where social and ideological homogeneity overlaps, deepening networks among people sharing similar backgrounds and beliefs. In contrast, where the Internet draws together those from diverse social backgrounds and beliefs, widening contacts, the typology suggests that this generates pure bridging groups. Nevertheless this pattern can be expected to vary systematically (a) by the type and depth of the social cleavage (such as by gender, race, or class), and (b) by the type of online group (such as by religious, union, or local community group). Just as the social background and ideological beliefs of members in nonvirtual communities typically vary in predictable ways, for example with more men usually joining sports clubs, trade unions, and political associations while more women often belong to religious organizations, so online communities could each be expected to reflect these differences as well.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Survey Evidence
To explore these propositions further we can turn to the Pew Internet and American Life project that has developed perhaps the more detailed series of daily tracking surveys investigating the practices and habits of Internet users in the United States (for details see Factor analysis showed that these items fell into two principle dimensions, representing how far people believed that their Internet experience helped them in either bridging social divisions of generation, race and class or bonding with people with similar interests and beliefs (see Table 1 ).
These items were recoded and summed to create separate bridging and bonding scales, standardized to 100-points for ease of interpretation.
What types of online groups promote experience of bridging and bonding?
The first issue is how far different types of groups like unions, community associations and sports clubs proved stronger at promoting the experience of the bridging or bonding functions of the Internet. The Pew survey asked how far people used the Internet to have any contact with, or to get any information from, a range of thirteen different types of online groups. Respondents were also asked to nominate which of these groups they were in contact with most often. Table 2 and Figure 2 shows the mean score on the perceived bridging and bonding function of the Internet as experienced by users of different types of online groups. The results show that overall contact with online groups was believed to serve both functions, but the experience was slightly stronger for reinforcing bonding (deepening contact with people of similar beliefs or interests)
rather than for bridging (widening contact with people from diverse social backgrounds). There were variations by the type of group, as expected, with the experience of contact with ethniccultural groups and groups sharing a similar lifestyle rated highest in both functions. Many groups clustered in the middle of the distribution while in contrast contact with sports groups, as a supporter or participant, was perceived to generate the least social benefits. Overall there was a strong relationship between these two functions (R 2 =.77). To see whether these differences among groups remained significant OLS regression models were run predicting the impact of contact with different types of groups on experience of the bonding or bridging functions of the Internet, including the standard social controls (for age, sex, education, income and race). The models in Table 3 show that even after controls were introduced, contact with most groups remained a significant predictor of evaluations of the bridging or bonding functions of the Internet.
The pattern suggests that online contact does bring together like-minded souls, who share particular beliefs, hobbies or interests, probably due to the hyper-pluralism and ideological diversity widely evident on the Internet, as well as widening social diversity.
[ Table 2 and Figure 2 about here]
These results can be broken down by the type of social diversity by comparing responses to the specific item that the Internet helped 'find people who share my beliefs' against the three items monitoring whether the Internet helped connect with people from different racial/ethnic, economic, or generational backgrounds. Figure 3 shows that participation in most online groups did little to bridge racial divides in America, other than contact with specific ethnic-cultural organizations. Group contact was also fairly ineffective on bridging the socioeconomic or class divide. But online communities did seem to have greater capacity of the Internet to cut across generational lines: those engaged in the online groups organized around lifestyles, ethnicity, community, hobby/interest and political associations found that the Internet helped to connect with people of different age groups. More groups fell into Mixed Type A category (generating experience of ideological homogeneity and social heterogeneity) by age group than by class or race. The reasons for this could be the younger age profile of the Internet population, combined with the tendency for more middle-aged memberships in many traditional organizations, so that online groups became a generational meeting place.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Conclusions
Many believe that any erosion in the traditional face-to-face sociability and personal communications or Gemeinschaft in modern societies represents a threat to the quality of civic life, collaborative social exchanges, and the community spirit. Whether the Internet has the capacity to supplement, restore or even replace these social contacts remains to be seen. As an evolving medium that is still diffusing through the population it remains too early to predict the full consequences of this technology. Nevertheless the Pew survey evidence among existing users allows us to explore whether those Americans who are most active in online groups feel that it widens their experience of community (by helping them to connect to others with different beliefs or backgrounds), or whether it deepens their experience (by reinforcing and strengthening existing social networks). The analysis suggests that in general the Internet serves both functions, although the strength of this effect varies in important ways by the type of online group in America. To go further, we need to explore more ethnographic studies of the inner life of communities, including those functional and dysfunctional for society as a whole. It is hoped that online communities could perhaps help to overcome traditional divisions among territorial communities, as exemplified by the ethno-religious enclaves in Belfast, the sharp divisions between the poorer inner cities and the affluent suburbs in Detroit, or racial divides in
Johannesburg. If we can extrapolate more broadly from this study of the American internet population, the results suggests that these hopes may prove to be exaggerated, but online participation has the capacity to deepen linkages among those sharing similar beliefs as well as to serving as a virtual community that cuts across at least some traditional social divisions. Bonding and bridging function 100-point scales: See Table 1 . The scales were estimated for those who had 'ever' used the Internet to contact these groups.
The difference between the mean scores on the bridging and bonding scales for those who had ever used the Internet to contact these groups and those who had not were all significant at . 
